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 The concepts of clientelism and patronage have been widely used in the analysis of 
political and social relations.  In contemporary political science literature, both concepts have 
increasingly come to denote a particular strategy of gaining political support by individuals or 
parties through the distribution of individual or collective goods to prospective voters.1 
Although there is some degree of overlap between clientelism and patronage, the former is 
generally used with reference to a dyadic relationship between two individuals of unequal 
socioeconomic status, while the latter is more commonly understood as the distribution of 
state resources by office holders. In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual, 
or the patron, may or may not be someone who holds an official position such as local party 
boss or deputy in the parliament. Consequently, the “favors” that he does for his clients may 
come from his own personal influence, status, and economic power and not necessarily from 
his access to public resources. The practice of political patronage, however, involves the 
distribution of individual or collective “favors” by a political party which controls 
governmental power and uses the resources of the state to gain votes and political support.  
 Political clientelism and patronage emerged as key analytical concepts in studies on 
social and political change by political scientists and anthropologists during the 1960s and 
1970s. Their work offered empirical evidence based on ethnographic case studies as well as 
new analytical constructs and theoretical perspectives, especially on traditional patron-client 
relations in predominantly agrarian societies. The first wave of research on clientelist 
relationships underscored the dyadic and asymmetrical nature of the ties between individuals 
of unequal power and status such as those which existed between landlords and peasants in 
Southeast Asia.2  While the work on pre-industrial, agrarian societies largely emphasized the 
economic bases of clientelistic networks, studies on clientelism and patronage in Southern 
European countries such as Spain and Italy sought to explain clientelistic social and political 
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phenomenon with reference to both cultural and economic factors. The first wave of research 
on political clientelism nearly four decades ago also included several major studies which 
delineated the integration of the traditional patron-client ties, based on the personal relations 
between locally influential notables and their peasant clients, into the organizations of 
political parties as a result of political, social and economic changes. Consequently, the 
transition from traditional forms of clientelism to the more modern practices of party 
patronage received considerable scholarly attention. 
An important feature of the early literature on political clientelism and patronage 
concerned their developmentalist and culturalist biases. The basic assumption of most of the 
studies was that economic development and industrialization would undermine the saliency of 
clientelistic practices since they were largely associated with pre-industrial societies.  
According to the then prevailing thinking, as countries became economically more developed, 
the influence of cultural traditions associated with “traditional societies” would gradually 
diminish. The developmentalist and culturalist approaches to clientelism and patronage also  
assumed that as a result of economic and social changes, horizontal group or class affiliations 
would replace the vertical ties of clientele networks as the primary bases of political 
preferences and electoral choice.      
 After a brief hiatus in the 1980s, political clientelism and patronage began to receive 
renewed scholarly attention during the 1990s. The studies carried out during the past two 
decades utilize some of the theoretical and conceptual approaches which had become 
fashionable two decades earlier. However, they also differ from the latter on a number of key 
issues.3 For example, the developmentalist and culturalist biases of the first wave of research 
is largely absent in the recent scholarship on political clientelism and patronage. It is now 
generally accepted that clientelistic practices exist in many contemporary societies which 
differ from one another significantly with respect to their level of economic development, 
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cultural attributes, and political systems. Recent studies have also raised questions about the 
validity of the previously held views concerning the transient and ephemeral nature of 
clientelism. As new research has underscored, political clientelism has shown remarkable 
durability and resilience by adapting to political and social changes. Adaptation implies the 
use of new strategies both by the suppliers (i.e., political parties and influential local patrons) 
and the consumers (i.e., citizens and clients) of political patronage and clientelism. As a result 
of their flexibility and resilience, varieties of clientelistic relations have survived over the 
years amidst social, economic, and political transformations.    
II 
 Studies on contemporary Turkish politics as well as the journalistic coverage of 
political life in the country often make references to varieties of clientelistic and patronage-
based behavior. These range from the role that the influential patrons (tribal or religious 
leaders, landlords, members of notable families, etc.) in Eastern Turkey play in politics to the 
efforts of political parties to offer individual or collective benefits to voters in exchange for 
support in electoral contest. The Turkish media frequently carries reports which highlight 
these practices. For example, during the campaign for the local elections in 2008, there were 
widespread reports in the media about the free distribution of household goods such as 
refrigerators and dishwashers by the local officials to the inhabitants of Tunceli, one of the 
poorest provinces in the country. Television news coverage showed the recipients of these 
“gifts from the government” proudly displaying their newly-acquired possessions. Although 
many apparently did not have electricity in their homes, and some had never even seen an 
automatic dishwasher before, they were delighted about the unexpected turn of good fortune 
in their daily struggle to make a living. Clearly, this blatant display of political patronage 
stemmed from the efforts of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to gain 
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political support in an electoral district where it had not done well against the opposition 
parties and independent candidates in the previous elections.   
The Historical Roots of Clientelism: 
  Clientelism and patronage have been historically part of Turkish society dating back to 
the days of the Ottoman Empire. Studies on Ottoman social history have often emphasized the 
importance and pervasiveness of clientelistic ties between the local notables (ayan) and 
peasants.4 The ayan managed to accumulate considerable economic power by acquiring the 
right to lease state-owned lands and collect taxes with the disintegration of the traditional land 
tenure system during the 17th and 18th centuries.. They were able to accumulate considerable 
economic and social power by acquiring the right to lease state-owned lands and collect taxes 
which had previously been in the domain of the fief holders.  The absence of effective central 
authority over the periphery meant that the peasants became increasingly dependent on the 
notables for their personal safety and property. Their need for protection against the arbitrary 
acts and corruption of local officials also contributed to their dependency on the notables  
1971). As a result, by the 18th century, the notables had emerged as “a significant social class 
mediating between the central government and its subjects.”5  During the course of the 19th 
century, the restoration of the Sultan’s authority in the provinces and the abolition of tax 
farming weakened the ayan. By the twentieth century, a new type of locally influential 
notables, namely, prosperous small town-merchants (eşraf) and large-landowners (ağa), had 
replaced the ayan in social influence.6  The agrarian elites and members of the leading notable 
families acted both as the protectors of the peasantry against the excessive and arbitrary acts 
of the officials and as channels of mediation between the central government and the local 
populations in the provinces.  
In his seminal work on center-periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire, Şerif Mardin 
notes that “patronage and client relations had long permeated Ottoman politics, but a 
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structural transformation after the middle of the nineteenth century changed the total 
picture.”7 According to Mardin, as a result of the center’s growing penetration into the 
periphery, the role played by the notables as the protectors of their clients’ interests and needs 
as well as channels of mediation between the center and the periphery increased significantly. 
Mardin also points out that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a new group joined the 
ranks of the notables. They were “the provincial men of religion, a number of whom were 
property owners…[whose]… influence and leverage over the lower classes was also 
established through their involvement in religion and education. Faced with increasing 
secularization, these men became more clearly involved with the periphery.” 8   
 Clientelistic relations continued to be important aspects of Turkey’s social and 
political landscape in the early part of the twentieth century. With the emergence of political 
parties during the last decade of Ottoman rule, members of prominent notable families entered 
into politics as parliamentary deputies and local party bosses of the Committee of Union and 
Progress CUP). The CUP established its organization in the provinces by recruiting influential 
notables into its ranks through “systematic use of patronage and economic regulation.”9   
Following the establishment of the Republic, the newly-formed Republican People’s Party 
(RPP), which functioned as the “official party” of the authoritarian single-party regime (!923-
46), similarly recruited notables from the leading local families of Anatolia to serve as 
parliamentary deputies and/or as leaders of the RPP’s local organizational units. The tacit 
alliance that the Republican leadership formed with the eşraf  served the interests of both:  It 
enabled the center to control the periphery via the notables who maintained clientelistic ties 
with their peasant clienteles, and it enabled the notables to maintain and strengthen their 
economic and social influence in the provincial cities and small-towns through their close ties 
with the Republican regime.  
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Mass Politics and Political Clientelism 
 Under the Ottoman Empire and during the formative years of the Republic, the 
clientelist system in Turkey displayed the characteristics of traditional patron-client relations 
that are found in predominantly agrarian or peasant societies. A traditional patron-client 
system is an exchange relationship in which “an individual of higher status (patron) uses his 
influence to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, 
for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal 
services, to patron.” 10  Although, as noted earlier, the emergence of Ottoman political parties 
at the turn of the 20th century witnessed the first examples of party patronage,   its scope 
remained limited. This was also true for the authoritarian one-party period. The regime did 
seek the support of the notables in the provinces and provided them with political and 
economic rewards. However, in the absence of competitive elections based on mass suffrage 
with multiple parties, the RPP did not feel the need to distribute patronage to large numbers of 
people in exchange for political support.   
 Political clientelism and party patronage began to play a much greater role in Turkish 
politics following the transformation of the country’s political regime and the emergence of a 
multi-party system in the immediate aftermath of World War II.11  Studies on local politics 
and patron-client relations show that with the beginning of party competition in the late 
1940s, clientelistic relations between the locally influential patrons and their peasant clients 
became an important, though clearly not the only, vehicle for electoral mobilization in many 
parts of rural Turkey where more than two-thirds of the eligible voters lived. At the same 
time, the clientelist networks built around factional divisions among prominent notable 
families served as the foundations for local party organizations. The recruitment of the locally 
influential notables into the two major parties, the RPP of the former authoritarian regime, 
and the Democratic Party (DP), the newly-formed main opposition party, facilitated the rapid 
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extension of their organizational networks to the provincial small-towns and villages of 
Anatolia. Hence, the formation of voter alignments among Turkey’s predominantly rural 
electorate during the late 1940s and early 1950s, was accomplished largely through a process 
of vertical mobilization. Political parties concentrated their efforts in recruiting members of 
notable families and faction leaders who used their networks of clientelist relationships with 
the peasants to mobilize electoral support. This form of vertical mobilization in the first phase 
of Turkey’s mass politics contrasted sharply with the history of democratization in Western 
Europe where horizontal solidarities based on common class or group affiliations had played 
an important role in shaping the emerging political loyalties.12     
 During the 1950s, political clientelism and patronage increasingly became established 
facts of Turkish political life.  With the exception of eastern and southeastern Turkey, where 
traditional patron-client relations prevailed and individual patrons (landlords, merchants, 
leaders of tribes and religious orders), exercised considerable control over their clients,13 
democratization brought about greater reciprocity and choice in clientelistic relationships and 
practices. Competition between patrons who were affiliated with different political parties 
meant that clients could demand greater benefits and assistance from them in return for 
political support at election times. Moreover, the 1950s witnessed an important change in 
clientelist politics: As parties established their dominance in national and local politics, the 
distribution of individual or collective benefits to potential voters increasingly began to take 
place through the organizations of the political parties rather than traditional patron-client ties. 
Unlike the traditional clientele relationships between notables and their clients, the 
distribution of state resources through party organizations in exchange for political support 
became an important means of gaining popular support.14 The DP, which came to power in 
1950 and remained the governing party for a decade, played a major role in the growth of 
party-directed patronage in Turkish politics.15 The DP’s leadership understood the importance 
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of party patronage and used its access to state resources to broaden its popular support by 
rewarding rural communities which voted for it (or pledged to vote in the next elections) with 
new roads, electricity, water, and various public works. Similarly, the DP also mastered the 
art of punishing those constituencies which voted for the political opposition by withholding 
similar rewards from them. The DP’s electoral successes in the 1950s demonstrated, among 
other things, the effectiveness of distributing patronage in exchange for votes. The growing 
importance of party patronage also led to the emergence of a new type of party worker, 
someone who was adept at performing various brokerage functions for the voters in return for 
political support. The DP’s local party organizations attracted large numbers of individuals 
who acted as intermediaries in helping the largely peasant electorate in the small-towns and 
villages in numerous ways, most typically in their encounters the local authorities and 
bureaucrats. In the cities, the DP also sought to increase its votes through the distribution of 
various forms of patronage, most commonly by providing its followers and potential 
supporters with jobs in the public sector. The main opposition party of the 1950s, the CHP, 
however, had a difficult time in adapting itself to the exigencies of patronage politics. Unable 
to transform its organization after decades of functioning as an “official” party of an 
authoritarian regime, it continued to rely more heavily on traditional patron-client relations 
than on patronage politics in rural Anatolia, especially in the less developed Eastern 
provinces. The fact that it failed to come to power during the 1950s also limited its ability to 
distribute political patronage through access to state resources. It took sometime for the CHP 
to adapt itself to the game of patronage politics and to recruit individuals who were skilled in 
performing the role of the broker into its local organizations.16  
Party Patronage and Clientelist Politics   
Since the initial phase of democratization and party competition more than half a 
century ago, political clientelism and patronage remained among the major characteristics of 
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Turkish society and politics. The manifestations of political clientelism and patronage are 
observable in many different aspects of Turkey’s political environment. The large number of 
people who flock to the Grand National Assembly building in Ankara on any given day in 
search of personal assistance and favors from the parliamentary deputies is a stark reminder of 
the importance attached to clientelist relationships.17 However, the nature of this particular 
clientelism has undergone changes over the years. In the early days of electoral politics, the 
visitors to the parliament were largely peasants from the rural areas who wished to see the 
deputies from their electoral districts.  Nowadays, most of the people who knock on the doors 
of the offices of the parliamentarians are typical brokers or middlemen who work for political 
parties or independent deputies. Their main task is to facilitate the distribution of 
particularistic goods and favors to the supporters (or potential supporters) of a deputy and 
his/her party. The nature of the particularistic goods have not changed significantly since the 
beginning of multi-party politics: jobs and employment, favorable treatment from the 
bureaucrats and state officials, assistance in finding medical care in Ankara, and influence 
peddling in a variety of different issues.18  It has also become a common practice nowadays to 
directly contact government ministers by visiting them in their offices to request these 
particularistic favors.19  While the demand for such favors has steadily grown, there has been 
a corresponding rise in the efforts of the deputies to actively recruit new clients through the 
use of brokers.20   
Turkey’s culture of political clientelism and the constant search for personal 
“connections” and particularistic favors manifests itself in other ways as well. For example, 
according to the official website of the President’s office in Ankara, 11, 973 people appealed 
directly to the country’s President—the highest political office in the country--for assistance 
between 2007 and 2009. 4,542 of these individuals asked for help in finding jobs while 7,431 
wanted financial aid.21  A similar picture concerning direct appeals for help and assistance 
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from political leaders emerges from a study of the Social Democratic Party (SHP) during the 
early 1990s when it was in power through a coalition partnership.22 Between November 1991 
and March 1993, Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP and Deputy Prime Minister of the 
coalition government, received 110, 889 personal petitions from the Turkish public. 33,795 of 
these (or 30.5 percent) asked for a job, while another 7.740  (6.9 percent) requested monetary 
help.23 Petitions regarding policy issues such as tax reform or privatization, ranked far beyond 
those about personal favors. Most of the petition writers emphasized that they had been 
staunch supporters of the SHP (some claiming that their political loyalty goes back to the days 
when İsmet İnönü, Erdal İnönü’s father, led the RPP), that they had voted for the party in 
every election, and hence deserved to be “helped”.  Others complained that while those 
parties which had come to power before the SHP had found jobs for their supporters in the 
public sector, the SHP had failed to do so for its supporters. Some openly asked that the 
SHP’s leader use his political clout to influence the outcome of the exams for job applicants 
in municipal government. The analysis of the petitions that were sent to the SHP’s leader by 
the people offer strong evidence about  the pervasiveness of the clientelist culture in Turkey in 
which people constantly search for personal connections with those in positions of authority 
and political power with the expectation of receiving a variety of favors and rewards.       
The precedent which was set by the DP in the use of state resources for political 
patronage has been followed, with varying degrees of success and effectiveness, by all other 
parties which have come to power since the early 1950s. Turkish parties have sought to use 
their access to the resources of the state for distributing collective goods, such as roads, 
electrification, and various public projects, in exchange for support in the national and local 
elections. Depriving those communities which support their rivals in party competition from 
these collective goods and rewards has been a favorite strategy of the parties in power. The 
most important source of party patronage has been employment in the public sector. Party 
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colonization of the state has enabled the governing party (or parties serving in a coalition 
arrangement) to provide jobs for their existing and potential supporters in the expectation that 
they will vote for the party in the elections. Allocation of jobs through patronage resources 
have ranged from high-ranking positions in key state agencies to employment as workers in 
the state-run industries. In addition to collective goods and employment, the rewards offered 
by parties have also covered a wide range, from packets of food and coal for the urban poor 
living in the gecekondu districts of the major cities, to lucrative contracts and favorable 
zoning arrangements to businessmen and construction companies. Control of the municipal 
governments in Turkey’s major cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana, has 
increasingly gained in importance for political parties during the past three decades since 
municipal administrations have considerable patronage resources, particularly with respect to 
employment in municipal services.   
The social, economic, and political changes which took place in Turkey since the 
beginning of mass politics have had several major consequences for political clientelism and 
patronage. As noted earlier, during the initial phase of democratization and multi-party 
politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Turkey had a largely agrarian economy and society. 
The majority of the newly-enfranchised citizens were peasants who worked on the land and 
lived in villages and small-towns. However, the massive migration to the cities from the rural 
areas, coupled with economic development and industrialization, has transformed these 
characteristics of Turkish society. As a result of the rapid increase in urbanization rates since 
the 1960s, more than two-the people now live in the cities whose populations have 
dramatically grown over the years. The explosive growth of the cities and their populations 
has changed the nature of the Turkish electorate from one that was largely rural into one 
which is predominantly urban. Today, the country’s three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and 
Izmir, collectively account for close to one third of the eligible voters.24   
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Political clientelism during the early days of party competition was largely associated 
with the agrarian nature of Turkish society. Networks of vertical ties between the locally 
influential patrons and their peasant clients formed the basis of the clientelist system which 
existed in many parts of rural Turkey. In small-towns and villages, much of political activity, 
including the work of party organizations, centered on these networks of clientelistic 
relations. When party-directed patronage began to replace traditional patron-client relations, 
the main goal of the parties was to gain the backing of the peasant voters through the 
distribution of particularistic and collective goods to rural communities. Varieties of rural-
based political clientelism and party patronage continue to be practiced today. In parts of 
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, traditional patron-client ties between the locally influential 
individuals (religious and tribal leaders, members of notable families, large landowners) and 
their followers or clients continue to be used for electoral mobilization. However, migration to 
the cities have led to a serious decline in the number of clients and the emergence of Kurdish-
based ethnic political parties have posed a serious challenge to the authority and influence of 
the traditional patrons. Party patronage also remains a fact of politics in the rural areas where 
the main work of the local party organizations involve the particularistic demands by the 
individual voters and collective goods (roads, schools, price subsidies for agricultural 
products, etc.) by the rural communities. But the swelling of the city populations has 
increased the scope and importance of political clientelism in the urban areas. The migrants 
from the rural areas, who make up a sizeable segment of the urban poor, have created a large 
pool of poor people who need assistance in finding jobs, medical help, and access to 
municipal services. Consequently, party organizations in the large cities seek to win the 
political support of the urban poor by assisting them to cope with a myriad of social and 
economic problems. In this respect, Turkey’s pro-Islamist parties have proved to be far more 
effective and successful than their pro-secularist rivals. Their success is partly due to the fact 
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that they have managed to replace vertical ties of clientelism with a new form of networking 
among the people. As practiced initially by the Welfare Party, and later developed further by 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), it involves frequent face-to-face interaction 
between party workers (most of whom are females) and their neighbors who live in the same 
neighborhood. Unlike the vertical clientelist ties, these are horizontal relationships which are 
based on the imece (or mutual help) tradition in Turkish society.25 Coupled with the 
distribution of particularistic goods through the party organization to the voters, the new 
networks of clientelism established by the AKP have proved to be a potent formula for 
electoral success among the urban poor.  
Conclusions  
 Political clientelism and patronage have long been important components of politics 
and society in Turkey. The onset of mass politics within a multi-party system and free 
elections following World War II expanded the scope of political clientelism and increased its 
importance in the emerging party system. While traditional patron-client relationships were 
widely used by parties seeking to entrench themselves in local political arenas, they were 
gradually replaced by party-controlled patronage in which particularistic and collective goods 
were distributed in exchange for political support in the elections. Given the importance 
which they attach to patronage as an effective strategy for winning votes, political parties 
have fought hard to come to power and control the patronage resources of the state. In 
particular, the allocation of jobs in the public sector to their loyal supporters and potential 
backers has been the most important goal of Turkish political parties regarding the benefits of 
controlling governmental power. However, several recent developments, such as the reforms 
implemented under the aegis of the IMF following the 2001-2002 financial crisis and the 
adoption of merit-based hiring principles for jobs in the state bureaucracy, have limited the 
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patronage resources of the governing party (or parties in a coalition) concerning employment 
in the public sector.  
 Despite the fact that clientelist practices and patronage-ridden politics have been 
commonplace in contemporary Turkish politics, the scholarly literature on these phenomena 
remains remarkably thin. There is urgent need for studies that would address the following 
questions: First, how are clientelistic relations and patronage networks structured in Turkey’s 
urban environments? The few case studies on clientelism and party patronage in Turkey are 
based on studies of small-towns in Anatolia.26  However, we have only limited information 
about clientelistic transactions between parties and voters in large cities. Given the fact that 
majority of the voters now live in the cities, it is important to carry out research on the 
characteristics and practices of urban clientelism and patronage. It would be especially useful 
to learn about the brokers and intermediaries in party organizations who work among the 
urban poor and provide assistance in exchange for electoral support. Secondly, how 
significantly are partisan loyalties and political preferences influenced by clientelism and 
party patronage? Although many observers and politicians assume that patronage is critical 
for electoral success, governing parties in Turkey, with few exceptions, have not managed to 
emerge victorious from two successive elections. Does this mean that distributing 
particularistic and collective goods is not necessarily critical in the electoral choices of the 
voters. Or do the governing parties fail to stay in power because they can not adequately meet 
the demands of the voters for particularistic and collective goods?  Thirdly, how do 
clientelism and patronage affect the internal workings of political parties in Turkey?27  
Turkish party leaders have traditionally exercised a great deal of control over their 
organizations. At the same time, major and minor parties have periodically experienced 
factional divisions and splits in their ranks. It would be important to know how party leaders 
use the power of patronage to reward their loyal supporters and punish their critics within the 
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party organizations. It would also be useful to learn about the clientele networks that exist 
between the party elites at the center and their followers in local organizations.. Fourth, what 
has been the impact of the emergence and growth of ethnic parties in Turkey on clientelist and 
patronage-driven practices? The political ascendancy of the pro-Kurdish parties in the 
Southeastern and Eastern provinces has significantly altered the electoral geography and 
voting patterns in these regions. Studies that can shed light on the relationship between 
clientelism and ethnicity in Turkey would be a welcome addition to the literature on 
contemporary Turkish politics.   
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